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The effects of resource rents on the political equilibrium have been studied in two main types 
of models. The first tradition employs models of conflict, and studies how resource rents 
affect the intensity and duration of civil conflict. The second tradition employs political 
economy models, where resource rents affect the political equilibrium because the costs and 
benefits of buying votes change. Although providing much insight, a primary disadvantage of 
these two model traditions is that they have little to say about when democracy emerges, and 
about when conflict emerges. This question is simply determined by the type of model one 
chooses to study. Yet an important empirical literature suggests that a main effect of resource 
rents may be exactly that it affects the political choice between democracy and civil conflict. 
In this paper, by integrating the earlier model traditions, we suggest the simplest possible 
framework we can think of to study this choice. The institutional outcome in our theory is 
consequently endogenous. We show how factors such as resource rents, the extent of electoral 
competition, and productivity affect economic and political equilibria, and discuss how our 
approach, mechanisms and results differ from the earlier theories. 
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One of the most studied empirical questions in the conflict and democracy literature over the 
last decade has been the connection between resource abundance and civil conflict. According 
to Collier and Hoeffler (2000, p. 26) “the extent of primary commodity exports is the largest 
single influence on the risk of conflict”. Damania and Bulte (2003) show that resource 
abundant countries are on average less democratic than resource poor countries. Several 
empirical studies, for instance Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) and Fearon and Laitin (2003), 
challenge the findings of the large literature initiated by Collier and Hoeffler, and conclude 
that a broad resource measure that includes all primary commodities does not have a robust 
association with civil conflict. Many studies have, therefore, investigated which particular 
natural resources may contribute to conflict, and which do not.  
 
For example, Ross (2001) finds that, after controlling for other factors, countries rich in oil 
have a higher probability of being a dictatorship than other countries. Auty and Gelb (2001) 
likewise concluded that ’point resources’ such as minerals, have a particularly strong 
association with destabilizing social tension, while Murshed (2003) suggests that ‘point 
resources’ retard democratic and institutional development. Similarly, de Soysa (2002) and 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that a dummy variable for oil exporters makes civil conflict 
more likely. Lujala (2005) concluded that onshore oil production increases the probability of 
civil conflict, but that offshore production does not, and Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore (2005) 
suggest that secondary diamonds increase the likelihood of conflict. In general, it seems fair 
to say that the results from the abundant empirical literature indicate that oil, gemstones, 
minerals and other ‘lootable’ resources are connected with civil conflict, but that there 
appears to be no similar effect of less lootable (and less valuable) resources such as 
agricultural land. An overview of this empirical literature is provided by Ross (2004). 
 
Theoretical studies of the effects of resource abundance on the political equilibrium can be 
divided into two main groups. The first group consists of conflict models where resource rents 
affect the intensity and duration of civil conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (2000) explain their 
empirical findings of resource abundance causing conflict in a model assuming that more 
resource rents make fighting more possible due to available financing, as well as more 
profitable since the prize for the ‘winner’ is larger. Skaperdas (2002) and Mehlum and Moene 
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(2002) show how the fighting efforts and the social waste of fighting increases with the size 
of natural resource rents. Torvik (2002) studies a rent seeking game where more natural 
resources makes rent seeking relatively more attractive when compared with production, and 
shows that as a consequence more natural resources in such a setting decreases overall 
welfare. Olsson (2004) sets up a predator-prey model where rebels choose between peaceful 
production and predation on natural resources. More natural resources may then depress 
public investment in favor of military spending used to fight off rebels.  
 
The second group of models where resource abundance affects the political equilibrium 
consists of models where voters are explicitly modeled. Tornell and Lane (1999) show how 
resource rents may yield a political equilibrium whereby each group attempts to acquire a 
greater share of production by demanding more transfers. In turn, more transfers increase the 
tax rate and reduce the net return on capital. This redistributive effect may then outweigh the 
direct effect of increased productivity. Alternatively, Robinson, Torvik and Verdier (2002) 
explicitly model politicians, and show how the costs and benefits of buying votes through 
inefficient redistribution, for instance by bribing voters with well-paid but unproductive 
public sector jobs, increases with public sector resource income. Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2005a) model underdevelopment as the result of political elites blocking technological and 
institutional development because such development may erode the elites' incumbency 
advantage. Such blocking is more likely to arise when the rents from maintaining power is 
high, such as where public income is derived from natural resources. In addition, and as 
discussed in Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier’s (2004) personal rule model, greater resource 
rents make it easier for dictators to buy off political challengers. Damania and Bulte (2003) 
show that when politicians maximize the surplus from a lobbying game, resource abundance 
may increase the income from lobbying, but divert the economy from its optimal path. Ades 
and Di Tella (1999) discuss how natural resource rents may stimulate corruption, and  
Robinson and Torvik (2005) show how increased resource rents may make it politically 
efficient to win votes by building ‘white elephants’, rather than efficient investment projects, 
even when voters are fully rational. 
 
Surprisingly, however, while there are many well-articulated models of conflict and resource 
rents on one hand, and models of politics and resource rents on the other, even a basic theory 
of how the choice between democracy and conflict endogenously depends on resource rents 
has not been developed. This paper attempts to address this theoretical deficiency by 
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suggesting a simple framework that integrates these established model traditions, and allows 
politicians to choose endogenously the type of regime that is in their own interest. 
 
The empirical literature on resource rents and conflicts points to several reasons why the 
attractiveness and intensity of fighting increases with resource rents. After taking the 
theoretical conflict literature into account, it also seems reasonable to conclude that the 
expected payoff from fighting is higher with higher more rents. But from this, one can not 
conclude that resource rents make conflict more likely. A sizeable literature points to the fact 
that resource rents also make the expected payoff from electoral competition higher, as 
resources to a large degree are publicly owned or taxable. The question is not whether 
resource rents make the absolute payoff from conflict higher, but rather whether resource 
rents make the payoff from conflict relative to democracy higher. To study this, one needs to 
integrate the conflict models and political economy models. Thus, we concur with Ross 
(2004), who discusses the mechanisms pointed out in the previous literature and argues that 
(p. 344) “Many of these arguments are, at a minimum, underspecified.”  
 
Violent competition is costly. An army must be set up, soldiers need to be paid, and property 
may be destroyed. However, competing through conflict also provides politicians with 
autonomy in case they win: that is, they are not accountable to voters. Competing in a 
democracy, on the other hand, is arguably less costly than competition through conflict. (In 
our case we assume that the direct cost of running in an election is zero). However, politicians 
are accountable to voters, and for opportunistic politicians this is a cost: they get away with 
less rents than if they where not constrained by voters. A priori, thus, it is not clear that 
politicians would always prefer one regime to the other. In our model, the politicians’ optimal 
regime choice will be seen to depend on political and economic characteristics of the 
economy at hand.  
 
Our model features two opposing politicians (or parties or groups) who fight over the control 
of the natural resource rents within society. The two politicians can either fight each other 
with armed forces or compete in an election. We assume that if both agree to run in an 
election, there will be an election in the beginning of each period. Otherwise, there will be 
conflict. If there is an election, the politicians compete by making offers on transfers to the 
voters. If the revenues from natural resources are greater than public transfers, the surplus is 
retained by the candidate in office. Since the candidates are assumed to maximize utility, they 
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design their platforms in order to maximize their expected rents. The institutional setting is 
characterized by majority voting and winner takes all. Majority voting implies that the 
platform which obtains the majority of votes becomes the implemented policy and winner 
takes all specifies that the politician in office has a monopoly on deciding policy.  
 
Voters’ preferences can be separated into two components. The first is common to all voters, 
is known by the candidates, and depends on the income of voters, i.e. labor productivity and 
public transfers. The second component describes voters’ heterogeneity and is not observed 
by the candidates. We thus use a version of Lindbeck and Weibull’s (1987) probabilistic 
voting model, where the two groups are not perfect substitutes for all voters, and hence the 
policy platforms do not entirely determine the electoral outcome. When there is uncertainty 
about the mean of the voters’ distribution, electoral competition is relaxed and positive rents 
emerge in equilibrium. After the election, the losing politician, that receives zero rent in the 
electoral period, decides whether or not to accept the electoral outcome. If the election 
outcome is accepted, the winner’s political platform is implemented and the winner consumes 
the remaining rent. If the electoral outcome is not accepted, conflict is initiated.  
 
Although a main focus of our model is the study of the economic causes of the choice 
between conflict and democracy, the model may also shed some light on the economic 
consequences. With conflict, income for the ‘electorate’ is lower than with democracy. As 
politicians are opportunistic in our setting, there are no income transfers under conflict – 
politicians simply try to retain power by paying soldiers for their fighting services. With 
democracy, on the other hand, the ‘fight’ for power is different – policy platforms are 
designed to attract voters. In such a regime political rents are, in part, transferred to voters, 
meaning that their income is higher with democracy than conflict. Furthermore, aggregate 
income with conflict is lower than with democracy. Fighting is unproductive (or destructive) 
from the point of view of society. When resources used for fighting have an alternative use 
with positive productivity, conflict reduces aggregate income even if destruction does not take 
place.  
 
Other than the literature discussed, our model is inspired by and most closely related to the 
pioneering works of Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001, 2005b). As in their models the key 
mechanisms result from politicians choosing the political system which is in their own 
interest. One primary difference is that in the Acemoglu-Robinson tradition the game occurs 
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between a political elite and the majority of the population. In our model, the game takes 
place between politicians (who in turn take into account the behavior of voters).  
 
In Section 2 we formulate the model, discuss how payoffs under democracy and conflict are 
determined, and derive the conditions for the different political equilibria. Section 3 provides 
some concluding remarks.  
 
2. The model 
 
Assume there are two politicians or political groups that compete for political power within 
society. The politician who secures power gets access to the resource rents of society and has 
the right to decide policy. The form of political competition – electoral competition or conflict 
- is endogenous. Politicians are assumed to choose the form of political competition that is in 
their own interest.  
 
The timing of events in the game is as follows. 
 
1.  Groups announce political platforms and/or initiate conflict. 
2.  If (at least) one group initiates conflict, conflict becomes the institutional equilibrium 
in that period. Conflict takes place and the winner get access to the rents of power 
which he consumes before the period ends. If no group initiates conflict, an election is 
held. 
3.  If an election is held, the losing party decides whether to accept the electoral result, or 
to initiate conflict. If conflict is initiated the winner get access to the rents of power 
which he consumes before the period ends. 
4. If conflict is not initiated, the announced political platform is implemented and the 
winning party consumes the remaining rent. 
5. A new period starts. 
 
We focus on the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) of this game. An MPE is a mapping 
from the current state of the game to strategies.  
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In the case of conflict the expected gross revenue which an organized group, I=A, B, can 
generate per period depends on the resource rents R  and the fighting efforts of the two groups 
IG . The military contest success function follows Tullock’s (1975) standard specification 
[see Skaperdas (1996) for an axiomatic derivation]. In this, the probability of winning equals 
the fighting effort of one’s own group relative to the total fighting effort. As our agents are 
assumed to be risk neutral this probability function can alternatively be though of as the share 
of rents from predation upon natural resources accruing to each group. Hence the gross 
revenue function in case of conflict, IΩ , is given by: 
 




G R I J A B I J
G G
Ω = = ≠+  
 
Conflict is (more) costly to initiate (than elections) – in our setting the initiation of conflict 
requires the fixed cost of F soldiers. Each additional soldier produces one unit of fighting 
effort. Wages are equal to the marginal productivity of labor in regular production, assumed 
to be constant at w . The cost of conflict for group I is then given by:   
 
(2) I IC wF wG= +  
 
Both groups choose the size of their labor force so as to maximize expected net revenue. 
Using equations (1)-(2) and taking the opposing groups’ fighting effort as given, this results in 
each groups’ reaction function:  
 
(3) ( ) , , , ,JI J JG Rr G G I J A B I Jw= − = ≠  
 
At any point in time, both groups observe the allocation of fighting effort by the other and 
adjust their own efforts accordingly. Therefore, with conflict the allocations of fighting efforts 








Thus the higher the resource rents relative to labor productivity in regular production, the 
more intense a fight will be. The per period expected utility that each group receives from a 







RU wF= −  
 
The expected utility of a fight is higher the higher the resource rent, the lower the marginal 
productivity of labor, and the lower the fixed cost of initiating conflict. Moreover, with a 
marginal increase in resource rents, half of this increase is wasted due to more fighting, and 
the other half accrues to the winner of the conflict. Thus on the margin the extent of rent 
dissipation in this simple set up is 12 . 
 
If a conflict is not initiated, there is an election to determine who wins power. Our 
specification of the electoral outcome is based on a simple version of probabilistic voting. The 
two parties or opposing groups compete in an election with an objective of maximizing their 
expected rent. The expected rent consists of the probability of winning the election IP , 
multiplied by the rents of power under democracy, IX . The per period expected utility under 
democracy, IDU , is given by: 
 
(6) , ,I I IDU P X I A B= =  
 
The number of voters is normalized to unity. The public spending or transfer to each voter  i  
from politician I is denoted iIg , and consists of the remaining resource rents after the 
incumbent politician has extracted his own rent: 
 
(7) , ,i IIg R X I A B= − =  
 
Voters have identical preferences over economic policy, but we allow for different 
preferences over ideological attributes of the political candidates. Per period income iIY  for 




(8) i i iI IY w g= +  
 
The per period utility of income for voter i  is: 
 
(9) ( )lni i iI IW w g= +  
 
and the full preferences for individual i are given by: 
 
(10) ( )i i iI I BW Dω σ δ= + +  
 
where iσ  is an individual specific parameter, δ  is the average, relative popularity of 
candidate B, and BD  is a dummy variable that takes the value of unity if party B wins the 
election and zero otherwise. We assume that the individual specific parameter, iσ , is 
uniformly distributed on the interval 1 1,
2 2φ φ
⎡ ⎤−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ with densityφ >0, whereas the relative popularity 
parameter, δ , is uniformly distribution at the interval 1 1,
2 2ψ ψ
⎡ ⎤−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  with density ψ >0. The 
realized value of δ  is not revealed until after the election, but the politicians are assumed to 
know the distribution ofδ . Voter i supports candidate A in period t if i i iA BW Wσ δ< ÷ ÷ . The 
number of voters who vote for politician A, AN , is then given by: 
 
(11) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1
2
ln ln 1 ln ln
2
A Bw R X w R XA A BN di w R X w R X
φ
δ φ φ δ+ − − + − −− ⎡ ⎤= = + + − − + − −⎣ ⎦∫  
 
The election probability for politician A, AP , is given by: 
 
(12) ( ) ( ){ }1Pr Pr ln ln2A A A BP N w R X w R Xδ⎧ ⎫= ≥ = ≤ + − − + −⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭  
 
which can be simplified to: 
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(13) ( ) ( )1 ln ln2A A BP w R X w R Xψ ⎡ ⎤= + + − − + −⎣ ⎦  
 
Clearly, candidate B wins with probability 1 AP− . Faced with this election probability, the 
candidates set policy in each period so as to maximize expected rents. The policy platform of 
politician A will be the solution of the following objective-function: 
 
(14) ( ) ( )1max ln ln
2A
A A A B A
X
P X w R X w R X Xψ⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤= + + − − + −⎨ ⎬⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭  
 
Similarly, politician B chooses BX  to maximize (1 )A BP X− . By symmetry we have full 
policy convergence - both candidates face the same problem and choose the same policy 
platform. The convergence in political platforms implies that the identity of the swing voter is 
given by ( ), ,S A BX Xσ δ δ= − . All voters with iσ  to the right of Sσ  vote for B, whereas all 
voters with iσ  left of Sσ  vote for A. The expected value of δ  is zero, and hence both parties 
expect to win the election with probability ½. 
 
From (14) and the symmetry properties we find the equilibrium rent for an incumbent under 
democracy as: 
 
(15) ( ) ( ), , min , 2 1I
w RX R w Rψ ψ
⎛ ⎞+= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
  
 
which is constrained by the fact that rents cannot exceed the per period resource rents.  We 
note that the more voters care about the economic outcome relative to other factors, i.e. the 
higher is ψ  , the lower are the equilibrium rents for politicians under democracy:  
 








The intuition for this is that when voters care much about economy, politicians loose many 
votes by transferring rents from voters to themselves, creating stiff electoral competition 
competing away much of the political rents by having power.  
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We also note that the higher the resource rents, and the higher the productivity in production, 




X X ψ= = >+   
 
The higher the resource rents, and the higher the productivity in production, the higher the 
rents for politicians under democracy. As the marginal utility of income decreases with 
income, a higher income in the first instance means that politicians find it less costly in terms 
of votes to take more of the resource rents themselves, and leave less for the voters. Since 
both candidates gain less in electoral support by promising a higher level of public transfers, 
the equilibrium rent is higher. 
 




2 2 2 1
I
D
w RU R ψ
⎧ ⎫+⎪ ⎪= ⎨ ⎬+⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 
 
Denoting the politicians’ discount factor of future income β  1≤  we then obtain: 
 
Proposition 1  Democracy is the unique equilibrium when 12ψ β+ < . 
 
Proof 
When an election takes place, the relative popularity parameter, and thus the identity of the 
swing voter is revealed, and party I=A, B, either lose or win the election. The looser has to 
decide whether to initiate a conflict, or to accept the electoral outcome. 
 
Consider first the case where a loser accepts the electoral outcome. In this case a loser will 
receive zero utility in this electoral period, but a chance to run again for election in the future. 
The current value expected discounted value of this, IDV , is: 
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w R w RV ββ ψ β ψ
∞
=
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ += + =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+ − +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∑   
Next, consider the case where a loser does not accept the electoral outcome and a conflict is 
initiated. In this case, he receives per period utility as given by equation (5). The expected 









V R wF R wFβ β
∞
=
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= − = −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∑  
 
As the model is symmetric, if politician I is not prepared to accept the electoral outcome if he 
loses the election, neither will agent J I≠  in case he loses. Therefore, if conflict is the 
equilibrium in the present period, it will also be the equilibrium in all future periods. The only 
two possible equilibrium paths of the game are that conflict is the equilibrium in each period, 
or that a stable democracy emerges. It follows that equations (19) and (20) are the only payoff 
functions politicians have to consider. A necessary and sufficient condition for democracy to 
be the unique stable equilibrium strategy at stage 0 of the game is that I ID CV V> , which can be 
restated as: 
 




β ψ ψ β⎛ ⎞+ + > + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
 
When 12ψ β+ <  the right hand side is negative. Since the left hand side is always positive, 
the proposition follows.■ 
 
When ψ is small, economic factors are not very important for voters relative to other 
characteristics of the candidates. This makes electoral competition weak, increasing the 
political rents of democracy, and making democracy relatively more attractive for politicians. 
When β  is large, politicians value future income more, or the electoral period is short. The 
prospect of future rents by competing in elections is then encouraging, and for the loser of the 
election it is less tempting to try to grab resource rents by initiating a conflict today. In the 
remainder of the paper we study the case where 12ψ β+ > so that conflict and democracy are 
both possible outcomes. We then have: 
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From (21) we note that the right hand side is increasing in R
w
, while the left hand side is 
independent of  R
w
. (Note that if the electoral result will not be accepted, both politicians see 
that the election will always be followed by conflict. Therefiore, there is no point in 
participating in elections in the first place and conflict will be initiated in stage 1 of the 
game).■ 
 
Thus, poor resource abundant countries are likely to end up with conflict, while rich resource 
poor countries are likely to end up as democracies.  
 
As seen from equations (19) and (20) - when R  increases, the expected return from 
participating in conflicts, as well as participating in elections, increases. From equation (19) 
and (20) we get: 
 












∂ ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟∂ −⎝ ⎠  
 
When 12ψ β+ > , the expected payoff from conflict increases more with higher resource rents 
than the expected payoff from election.  
 









+ += + − , the 
expected return of democracy is higher than the expected return from initiating conflict, and 
hence in this region the state of the game is democracy. If resource rents are higher than the 
critical value *R , the expected return from competing in elections, given that the last election 
is lost, is lower than the expected return from initiating conflict. Accordingly, in this region 
the state of the game is conflict. At the margin, conflict allows politicians to capture a larger 
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fraction of increased resource rents than competing in elections. For sufficient resource 
abundant countries it is then in the politicians’ interest to initiate conflict, rather than promote 
democracy. 
 
On the other hand, a higher level of economy wide productivity, w, is conflict preventing.  
From equations (19) and (20) it can be seen that a higher w increases the expected return from 
elections and reduces the expected return from conflict. For both reasons the critical value *R  
increases, so that a higher level of the resource rent is tolerated without the economy ending 
in the conflict equilibrium.  
 
The intuition is that there are four effects on the choice of political equilibrium from higher 
labor productivity. First, high labor productivity makes it more attractive to be an elected 
politician. When agents are relatively well off, at the margin they value increased income less 
than if they are relatively poor. This makes electoral competition less stiff, allowing higher 
equilibrium rents for politicians. Second, higher labor productivity implies that a higher wage 
must be paid to build an army, making this strategy more costly. Third, a higher wage means 
that each unit of fighting effort becomes more costly. Fourth, a higher wage means that the 
opponent allocates fewer resources to fighting. The latter two effects cancel each other out 
under the standard probabilistic fighting function, and the two remaining effects explain why 
higher labor productivity makes democracy more attractive relative to conflict for politicians. 
 
Note that in our model the source of a country’s wealth affects the institutional outcome; 
countries rich because of much natural resource rents end up in conflict, while countries rich 
because of a high economy wide productivity end up as democracies. 
 
Even this very simple model challenges conventional wisdom received from the standard 
political economy models. We discuss how in the following two propositions. 
 
Proposition 3 Stiff electoral competition (high ψ ) may produce lower transfers to voters. 
 
Proof 
From equations (19) and (20) we note that ψ decreases the payoff of democracy while leaving 
the payoff from conflict unchanged. Therefore, a higher ψ may change the political 
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equilibrium from democracy to conflict. With conflict, politicians have no reason to give 
direct transfers and the proposition follows.■ 
 
A standard result in models of political economy is that when electoral competition is stiff, 
the income of voters will be higher (as they get more transfers) and equilibrium rents for 
politicians will be lower. The reason this need not be the case in our model is that we do not 
exogenously assume that the institutional outcome is democracy. As a consequence, when 
electoral competition is sufficiently stiff, democracy does not emerge – and as a consequence 
– politicians grab all the resource rents and transfers to voters are zero. 
 




With democracy, aggregate income is given by w+R. With conflict, aggregate income is 
given by 12
,
( ) 2I I
I A B
w R wF wG w R wF
=
+ − + = + −∑ . As a higher ψ may change the equilibrium 
from democracy to conflict the proposition follows.■ 
 
Accordingly, we may obtain the paradoxical result that the more voters care about the 
economic outcome of elections relative to other factors of the candidates (i.e. the higher is ψ ), 
the worse is the economic outcome. When voters care more about income, democracy is less 
likely, and income is lower. 
 
The claim that stronger electoral competition creates economic efficiency has been attacked in 
an influential paper by Coate and Morris (1995). Criticizing what they term the Chicago view 
of political competition – that stronger political competition creates economic efficiency – 
they show that when voters are uncertain of the effects of economic policy, inefficient policies 
need not be competed away. Bardhan and Yang (2004) provide additional mechanisms. In our 
model, by contrast, voters have full information and stiff electoral competition may still 
produce an inefficient economic outcome. In that respect our result is related to Robinson and 
Torvik (2005), where stronger electoral competition makes inefficient transfers to voters more 
tempting so as to secure political power. Again, the principal contrast between our mechanism 
and those found earlier is that our mechanism is driven by the endogenous choice of 
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democracy or conflict, so that with sufficiently strong electoral competition democracy is not 
an equilibrium outcome.  
 
3. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper, we have developed the first, and we believe simplest, possible setup to study 
how resource rents affect the political choice between conflict and democracy. In line with 
empirical results, resource wealth makes conflict more likely while high income due to high 
productivity makes democracy more likely.  
 
Higher resource wealth increases the expected payoff from both elections and conflict. 
However, the choice between the two depends on the relative payoffs, and if democracy is not 
the unique equilibrium resource rents increase the payoff from conflict by more than the 
payoff from elections.  Increased resource wealth thus puts democratic institutions to a 
survival test. Countries will not pass this test if the resource wealth is sufficiently high, labor 
productivity sufficiently low, political competition sufficiently strong, or politicians 
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